The paper presents a novel cryptographic authentication scheme that makes use of the presence of electronic devices around users. The scheme makes authentication more secure by involving devices that are usually worn by users (such as smart-watches, fitness bracelets and smart-cards) or are in their proximity (such as sensors, home appliances, etc.). In our scheme, the user private key is distributed over all personal devices thus cannot be compromised by breaking into only a single device. Furthermore, involving wearables and IoT devices makes it possible to use multiple authentication factors, such as user's position, his behavior and the state of the surrounding environment. We provide the full cryptographic specification of the protocol, its formal security analysis and the implementation results in this paper.
INTRODUCTION
In modern society, people are surrounded by a huge amount of so-called smart devices, such as smartphones, tablets, smart-cards, smart-watches, etc. Furthermore, the amount of various sensors, smartmeters and smart-home appliances increases significantly. The current trend is to interconnect all these devices into a single network, called the Internet of Things (IoT). Although the aforementioned devices have only small computational and memory resources, they are programmable and can communicate with one another.
Despite there are so many electronic devices around us, we usually use only a single device to access electronic services, either a PC, a tablet or a smart-phone. However, if such a device gets compromised by attackers, the security is gone and attackers can access user's assets. For example, if user's smart-phone gets stolen and the password for electronic banking is revealed (or stored in memory), the attacker might get access to the user's account.
We resolve this weakness by involving multiple personal devices in the authentication process. These devices can provide additional authentication data. For example, if a user owns a smart-watch, it would be natural to check its presence during the authentication. Or, it would be useful to check the presence of a wireless home router in some applications where we want to allow the access only from users from a home location. For very sensitive applications, it would make sense to check for multiple factors, such as the password knowledge, the presence of a smartcard and the presence of a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) beacon device that certifies position.
In this paper, we provide the description of a cryptographic protocol that allows such an involvement of many constrained devices in the authentication process. We propose a provably secure protocol that distributes the user's private key among multiple devices. To get authenticated, the user must prove the knowledge of all parts of his private key that corresponds to his personal public key. Our protocol is provably secure and easily implementable on all programmable constrained devices, such as smart-cards, smart-watches, sensors and wearables in general.
Related Work and Contribution
The design of cryptographic protocols for user authentication is the topic of countless scientific papers, starting with the proposals of traditional authentication protocols (Neuman and Ts' O, 1994; Lashkari et al., 2009) , provably secure authentication protocols based on zero-knowledge proofs (Schnorr, 1991; Guillou and Quisquater, 1988) , to privacy-enhanced authentication protocols (Camenisch and et Al., 2012; Paquin, 2011) and light-weight protocols (Chien and Huang, 2007 not many papers focusing on using the combination of many devices, i.e. the multi-device authentication, exist. Xu (Xu, 2015) focuses on biometric authentication using wearables, namely on face recognition using smart-glass and gait recognition using smart-watch. Cha et al. (Cha et al., 2015 ) present a simple model for two device authentication for micro-payment systems using a mobile and wearable devices. Nevertheless, their approach lacks more details and concrete cryptographic functions. To some extent, the concepts of continuous authentication (Shepherd, 1995) and progressive authentication (Riva et al., 2012) are close to our approach as they are also based on combining multiple sources of authentication data. However, the schemes are using mainly biometric authentication factors. The most related work from 2015 (Gonzalez-Manzano et al., 2015) presents an access control mechanism for cloud-based storage service access by using a set of devices. However, their scheme is based on symmetric cryptography, thus does not provide nonrepudiation. Furthermore, there is no formal security analysis provided in the paper.
Based on the current state analysis, to our best knowledge, we present the first cryptographic scheme that 1) allows strong multi-device authentication, 2) is provably secure, 3) provides non-repudiation and allows private keys to never leave the user device, 4) is easily implementable on personal and wearable devices and 5) allows simple registration and deregistration of personal devices. Using this authentication scheme, the practical access control mechanisms can get much more secure without any negative influence on usability and user friendliness.
Paper Outline
We provide the preliminaries in Sec. 2, the security model and description of protocols in Sec. 3, the security proof in Sec. 4 and the implementation results in Sec. 5.
PRELIMINARIES 2.1 Notation
We describe Proof of Knowledge protocols (PK) using the efficient notation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler (Camenisch and Stadler, 1997a) . The protocol for proving the knowledge of a discrete logarithm of an element c with respect to a generator g is denoted as PK{α : c = g α }. The symbol ":" means "such that", "|" means "divides", "|x|" is the bitlength of x and "x ∈ R {0, 1} l " is a randomly chosen bitstring of maximum length l.
Used Primitives
Our scheme is based on Schnorr's identification scheme (Schnorr, 1991) . That, in turn, makes use of the protocols for the interactive proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm (Camenisch and Stadler, 1997b) . Using the cryptographic proofs of knowledge, it is possible to prove the knowledge of a private value of a discrete logarithm w with respect to public values c, g, p such that c ≡ g w (mod p) holds in modular multiplicative group Z * p where p is a large prime and g is a group generator. The protocol can be denoted as PK{w : c = g w }. We use the modification of this protocol called the proof of representation, denoted as PK{w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w i : c = g
Furthermore, we use a signature scheme that can be obtained by hashing the protocol challenge e with the message using the Fiat-Shamir heuristics (Fiat and Shamir, 1987) . The signature on message m is then denoted as SPK{w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w i : c = g
MULTI-DEVICE AUTHENTICATION
In multi-device authentication, there are three types of entities (or roles) in the system:
• Verifiers: usually service providers that need to verify the identity of their users.
• Users: customers that are represented by their master devices (PCs, laptops, smart-phones, tablets, . . . ). Users need to prove their identity.
• Devices: constrained personal devices (smartcards, smart-watches, sensors, RFID tags, . . . ), that are involved in the authentication process to strengthen security.
These entities engage in the following protocols:
the protocol is run by a Verifier and a User to generate and share initial parameters. It inputs the security parameter k, the maximum of user devices d and outputs the system parameters spar and User's initial keypair (sk 0 , . . . , sk i ), pk U .
• (Accept/Reject) ←Authenticate(spar, (sk 0 , . . . , sk i ), pk U ) protocol: the protocol is run jointly by a User, his devices and a Verifier to prove the knowledge of User's private keys. It inputs the system parameters spar, the User's public key pk U , all corresponding private keys (sk 0 , . . . , sk i ) and outputs Accept if the proof is valid and Reject otherwise.
• (pk U ) ←Register(spar, (sk 0 , . . . , sk i ), pk U , sk i+1 ) protocol: the protocol is run jointly by a User, his devices and a Verifier to register a new device in the system. It inputs the system parameters spar, new (i + 1)'th device's private key sk i+1 , the User's keypair (sk 0 , . . . , sk i ), pk U and outputs an updated User's public key pk U that corresponds to sk i+1 and all previous private keys of the user.
• (pk U ) ←Deregister(spar, (sk 0 , . . . , sk i ), pk U , sk i+1 ) protocol: the protocol is run jointly by a User and the Verifier to deregister the public key of his device, in case the device needs to be revoked (due to loss, damage, theft, etc.). It inputs the system parameters spar, existing (i + 1)'th device's private key sk i+1 , the User's keypair (sk 0 , . . . , sk i ), pk U and outputs an updated User's public key pk U that corresponds to all previous private keys of the user except sk i+1 .
In classical authentication, the Authenticate protocol only proves User's knowledge of a password and keys stored in his master device to a Verifier. In multi-device authentication, each device has its private cryptographic key that corresponds to a general public key stored by a Verifier. The Authenticate protocol proves the knowledge of all private keys to a Verifier without revealing them. Thus, authentication is successful only if the whole group of preselected devices participate in the protocol. However, this group can be changed jointly by Users and Verifiers, using the Register and Deregister protocols.
Security Model
We use and prove properties for authentication protocol completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge (Quisquater et al., 1989) . The completeness property states that honest Users are almost always accepted by Verifiers, the soundness property states that dishonest Users are almost always rejected by Verifiers and the zero-knowledge property states that the protocol leaks no information about Users' private keys, using the simulation paradigm (i.e., all the public protocol values can be efficiently generated without the knowledge of private keys). Definition 1. Authentication completeness. An honest Verifier rejects an honest User (i.e., the one using private keys that correspond to the public key) with probability negligible in the length of the security parameter k. Definition 2. Authentication soundness. An honest Verifier accepts a dishonest User (i.e., the one using private keys that do not correspond to the public key) with probability negligible in the length of the security parameter k.
Definition 3. Authentication zero-knowledge. There exist a simulator S that is able to efficiently generate a protocol transcript indistinguishable from a real protocol transcript without the knowledge of private keys.
Scheme Instantiation
In this section, we provide the concrete instantiation of the protocols used in our scheme. All operations are computed in Z * p .
Setup Protocol
On the input of the security parameter k and device number parameter d, a Verifier randomly selects a group G = g of prime order q : |q| = k where DL assumption holds, chooses d + 1 random elements
as public system parameters spar to all Users and devices over a secure channel 1 . A User selects his private key at random, i.e., computes sk 0 ∈ R Z q and computes his public key as pk 0 = g sk 0 0 . If some additional device is already present, it also generates its private key, i.e. computes sk 1 ∈ R Z q , and computes its public key as pk 1 = g sk 1 1 . The same applies if more devices are present. We note that the device private key never leaves the device, only the public key is revealed. Finally, the User (represented by his master user device) computes the user public key as pk U = ∏ l i=0 pk i for all l available devices and distributes this public key to the Verifier over a secure channel.
Authenticate Protocol
In the Authenticate protocol, the User must prove that he knows all private keys sk o , . . . , sk i that were used to construct the public key pk U . This can be realized by the proof of discrete logarithm representation, a protocol denoted as PK{(sk 0 , . . . , sk i ) : pk U = g sk 0 0 . . . g sk i i }. Since the User's master device does not know the private keys, except sk 0 , the proving protocol must be distributed among all devices, as depicted in Fig. 1 in CS notation and in Fig. 2 in full notation. 
Register Protocol
The Register protocol is used when a new device needs to be added to the set of user devices. In that case, the new device generates its private key, i.e., computes sk i+1 ∈ R Z q , and computes its public key as pk i+1 = g sk i+1 i+1 . The new public key must be delivered to the master device using a secure channel. Then, the master device may authenticate itself to the Verifier (using the Authenticate protocol) and provide the new public key pk i+1 . The Verifier then updates the main User's public key pk U = pk U * pk i+1 . After this update, the new (i + 1)'th device must be always used in the Authentication protocol. The Register protocol is depicted in Fig. 3. 
Deregister Protocol
In case some of devices gets lost, stolen or stops working, a User can use the Deregister protocol to remove it from the set of registered devices. The User first sends the public key of the invalid device, e.g. pk i+1 , to the Verifier. The Verifier temporarily
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pk i+1 removes the device and computes the temporal public key pk temp = pk U * pk −1 i+1 . Then, the Verifier asks the User to authenticate with respect to the pk temp . If the User is able to successfully finish the authentication protocol, the Verifier sets the temporal public key as permanent, i.e. sets pk U = pk temp . The protocol is depicted in Fig. 4 .
SECURITY PROOF
We prove the completeness, soundness and zeroknowledge in this section. Theorem 1. Authentication protocol is complete as defined in Def. 1.
Proof. We prove the authentication protocol's completeness using the verification equation used in the authentication protocol depicted in Fig. 2 . Based on the implementation results, we state that the authentication protocol can be easily implemented on smart-phones and smart-watches with running times around 10 ms, on micro-computers with running times under 100 ms for the standard variant and around 200 ms for the more secure variant. The protocol can be also implemented on programmable smart-cards using the Multos smart-card platform with running times under 1 s for all variants. The worst results were obtained using a microSD secure element, a device that is used for storing sensitive cryptographic information on mobile phones. Using this device, the authentication protocol would take around 3 seconds.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel multi-device authentication scheme. By using the inputs from personal and wearable devices, the authentication process gets more secure and reliable as it is possible to verify not only user's knowledge of a password, but the presence of his wearables, tags and smart-devices at his location. The scheme does not require any additional actions from a user, allows easy registration of new personal devices and deregistration of invalid devices. The full security analysis is provided and implementation aspects are described in this paper. As the next step, we focus on adding privacy-enhancing features to this scheme.
